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The paper shows that there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity in forecast accuracy 
among Fed watchers. Based on a novel database for 268 professional forecasters since 
1999, the average forecast error of FOMC decisions varies 5 to 10 basis points 
between the best and worst-performers across the sample. This heterogeneity is found 
to be related to both the skills of analysts – such as their educational and employment 
backgrounds  – and to geography. In particular, there is evidence that forecasters 
located in regions which experience more idiosyncratic economic conditions perform 
worse in anticipating monetary policy. Moreover, systematic forecaster heterogeneity 
is economically important as it leads to greater financial market volatility after FOMC 
meetings. Finally, Fed communication may exert an influence on forecast accuracy. 
 
JEL No.: E52, E58, G14 
Keywords: monetary policy; forecast; Federal Reserve; FOMC; geography; skills; 
heterogeneity; survey data; communication; United States. 
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Information and geography play an important role in financial markets by affecting asset 
prices, trading behavior, and the location choice of financial firms. There is ample evidence in 
the literature that geography and information also matter when it comes to the performance of 
financial market analysts and the profitability of mutual fund investments. For instance, it has 
been shown that profits tend to be higher when funds invest in firms located near to the fund’s 
offices, and market analysts perform better when they focus on firms close by  
 
The present paper analyzes whether this role of information and geography extends to the 
way financial market participants anticipate US monetary policy. In particular, we ask to what 
extent geography, regional economic developments, and personal skills determine the ability 
of professional forecasters to predict monetary policy decisions by the US Federal Reserve.  
 
The paper uses a novel dataset of 268 professional forecasters who are located across 98 cities 
in 15 countries, for FOMC decisions between February 1999 and September 2005. The 
dataset contains each forecaster’s survey expectations for FOMC decisions, as well as 
information about the individual’s forecasts of inflation and economic activity. Moreover, the 
data includes information related to analysts’ skills, e.g. the type of institution, his or her 
position within that institution, employment record and educational background. We combine 
this dataset with information about the economic conditions specific to the region in which 
each individual is located. 
 
As a key stylized fact, the degree of heterogeneity in the forecast performance across 
individuals is large: after grouping forecasters by performance over the full sample period, the 
absolute forecast error differs by 5 basis points (b.p.) between the best and the worst 10%. 
This difference rises to 10 b.p. when analyzing only those FOMC meetings that had some 
degree of heterogeneity across forecasters. We find such forecaster heterogeneity to be 
important, in the sense that heterogeneity of monetary policy expectations significantly raises 
financial market volatility in response to the announcement of monetary policy decisions. 
 
What explains the heterogeneity in expectations across Fed watchers? As to geography, we 
find that regional economic developments matter, as forecasters make larger errors the more 
economic developments in their home region differ from their average. Moreover, the 
prediction error of those in New York City or in other financial centers, either in the USA or 
abroad, is about 2 b.p. lower. Forecasters who are located in or close to Washington DC do 
even better by exhibiting an error that is 4 b.p. lower. 
 
A complementary finding is that differences in forecast performance are related to the skills 
of individual forecasters. We find that analysts who work for investment banks do better than 
others. Professional experience and education also matter for forecast accuracy: analysts who 
previously worked for the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors perform better, as do   
analysts with a Master’s degree.  
 
In addition, the empirical analysis shows that forecasters who do well in predicting monetary 
policy also do well in anticipating US inflation, providing  the most direct piece of evidence 
that skills and individual background are significantly linked to the forecast accuracy.  
 
Finally, we investigate the role of communication by the Federal Reserve for heterogeneity in 
forecast performance. We find that more communication reduces disparities in forecast 
performance stemming from differences in regional economic conditions, whereas we find 
that the superior forecast accuracy of some analysts is related to their ability to extract 
relatively more or better information from Fed communication. 
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Information and geography play an important role in financial markets by affecting asset prices, 
trading behavior, and the location choice of financial firms. For instance, the home bias in 
international investments and consumption is influenced by information asymmetries regarding 
risks involved with foreign investment (see, e.g., Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock 2004, Portes 
and Rey 2005). Geography and information also matter when it comes to the performance of 
financial market analysts and the profitability of mutual fund investments. Profits tend to be 
higher when funds invest in firms located near to the fund’s offices, and market analysts perform 
better when they focus on firms close by (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz 1999, Bae et al. 2005). 
Finally, geographic proximity and common socio-cultural attitudes remain highly relevant for 
explaining information asymmetries and economies of scale in information processing, which is 
among the arguments why financial companies agglomerate in international financial centers 
(e.g., Strauss-Kahn and Vives 2005). 
 
The intended contribution of the present paper is to analyze whether this role of information and 
geography extends to the way financial market participants anticipate US monetary policy. In 
particular, we ask to what extent geography, regional economic developments, and personal skills 
determine the ability of professional forecasters to predict monetary policy decisions by the US 
Federal Reserve. While it is known that expectations on U.S. monetary policy differ across 
financial market analysts and participants (Swanson 2006), to our knowledge, this is the first 
paper that analyses this heterogeneity, rather than the mean or median in expectations about 
monetary policy, and its economic relevance and determinants.  
 
The presence of systematic forecaster heterogeneity is important for at least two reasons. First, if 
heterogeneity of forecast accuracy prior to FOMC meetings leads to greater financial market 
volatility and uncertainty afterwards, this could distort investment decisions, make it harder for 
firms to raise funds, and, more generally, decrease the efficient allocation of capital in the 
economy. Indeed, we find evidence that observed differences in forecasting ability are highly 
relevant for financial market behavior, as heterogeneity of monetary policy expectations 
significantly raises financial market volatility. Second, the question of heterogeneity of monetary 
policy expectations is also important because modern central banks have undertaken substantial 
efforts over the past decade to enhance transparency and communicate with financial markets and 
the wider public. In fact, the credibility and thus the effectiveness of monetary policy crucially 
depend on financial markets’ ability to understand monetary policy decisions and anticipate the 
future path of policy. In an extension to the main analysis, we therefore investigate how Fed 
communication affects the cross-sectional dispersion of interest rates forecasts.  
 
The paper uses a novel dataset of 268 professional forecasters – covering many major investment 
banks, commercial banks and forecasting institutions – who are located across 98 cities in 15 
countries, for FOMC decisions between February 1999 and September 2005. The dataset is 
extremely rich as it contains not only each forecaster’s survey expectations for FOMC decisions, 
but also information about the individual’s forecasts of other economic variables, such as 
inflation and economic activity. Moreover, the data includes information related to analysts’ 
skills, e.g. the type of institution, his or her position within that institution, employment record 
and educational background. We combine this dataset with information about the economic 
conditions specific to the region in which each individual is located. 
 
As a key stylized fact, the degree of heterogeneity in the forecast performance across individuals 
is large: after grouping forecasters by performance over the full sample period, the absolute 
forecast error by the group of the 10% of the worst forecasters is 5 basis points (b.p.) higher than 
that of the best decile of analysts, when measured across all FOMC meetings. This difference 
rises to 10 b.p. when analyzing only those FOMC meetings that had some degree of heterogeneity 
across forecasters. This is of the same order of magnitude we have found in a related analysis for 
the heterogeneity of forecasts of ECB monetary policy decisions (Berger, Ehrmann and 
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chance. What is more, a significant part of this heterogeneity is systematic, that is, we find 
compelling empirical evidence that skills and geography play a significant and substantial role in 
explaining the predictability of monetary policy decisions by the Federal Reserve. Overall, this 
implies that there is indeed a substantial systematic and sizeable difference in the ability of 
individual analysts to anticipate FOMC policy decisions, in particular in times when FOMC 
decisions are harder to predict. 
 
What explains the heterogeneity in expectations across Fed watchers? As to geography, we find 
that a number of locational factors systematically influence the ability of forecasters to anticipate 
US monetary policy. The forecast errors of analysts who are based in the Northeastern or 
Midwestern regions of the United States are significantly lower than those e.g. located in the 
South. In particular, the prediction error of those in New York City or in other financial centers, 
either in the USA or abroad, is about 2 b.p. lower. Forecasters who are located in or close to 
Washington DC, i.e. in immediate proximity of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 
do even better by exhibiting an error that is 4 b.p. lower, although there are only few such 
analysts in the sample. By contrast, other US-based analysts do not appear to perform better than 
their foreign counterparts. Also foreign analysts who operate in an English-language environment 
do only as well as those who work in a location where a different language is spoken.  
 
Moreover, we find that forecasters take a local perspective in the sense that regional economic 
developments shape their forecasting ability for US monetary policy. In particular, forecasters 
make larger errors the more economic developments in their home region differ from their 
average. This finding applies to regional developments in inflation as well as income and 
employment growth.  
 
Taken together, these findings underline that geography plays a substantial role in explaining the 
heterogeneity in the predictability of US monetary policy. But what does geography reflect? One 
hypothesis is that it reflects information asymmetries. Support for this hypothesis is provided in 
particular by the effect of regional economic factors, such as different inflation, income or 
employment growth rates, on forecast errors. Given that monetary policy decisions are made on 
the basis of nationwide economic developments, the fact that differences in regional economic 
conditions affect policy predictability implies that agents base their forecasts on different, and at 
least partly geography-related information sets. 
 
A complementary hypothesis is that differences in forecast performance are related to the skills of 
individual forecasters. The overall skill set of an analyst is influenced by many factors, for 
instance by the resources of the forecaster’s employer, his or her past professional experience or 
the educational background. We indeed find strong empirical evidence for the role of individual 
skills. First, analysts who work for investment banks do better than those in other financial and 
non-financial companies. This result may be related to the fact that the former may have more at 
stake and thus devote more resources to monetary policy analysis. Second, it is intriguing that 
analysts who have the position of Economist in their institution do better than forecasters with 
higher-ranking titles, in particular executives. Since we control for differences in the type of 
institution, one interpretation is that executives may be less specialized and be able to devote less 
time and resources to following the Fed and thus ultimately provide worse forecasts. 
 
Third, professional experience and education matter for forecast accuracy. We find – probably 
not surprisingly – that analysts who previously worked for the Federal Reserve’s Board of 
Governors perform in some cases significantly better, with up to 1.8 b.p. smaller forecast errors. 
Moreover, analysts with a Master’s degree perform significantly better than those with other 
degrees. Interestingly, having a Ph.D. does not appear to provide analysts with any advantage in 
terms of better forecast accuracy, even when controlling for all other skill and geography 
variables, which could suggest that specialized technical skills may not be all that crucial for 
predicting monetary policy decisions. 
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A related result of the empirical analysis is that forecasters who do well in predicting monetary 
policy also do well in anticipating other economic developments, such as domestic inflation in the 
country. This provides a strong, and the most direct piece of evidence that skills and individual 
background are significantly linked to the forecast accuracy of monetary policy decisions.  
 
This last point leads us to the next question: Are and, if so, how are geography and skills 
connected? It is possible that geography and skills are highly correlated and thus that what we 
measure as the effect of geography could at least in part reflect differences in the skill set of 
analysts, or vice versa? If, for instance, skilled analysts tended to move to New York City 
disproportionally, then the geography variable for New York City may pick up this concentration 
of skills, rather than information alone.
1 We therefore combine the analysis of skills and 
geography and find that the results basically remain unchanged when modeling both sets of 
variables simultaneously. In fact, some of the results for the role of geography are even somewhat 
strengthened in this combined analysis, underlining the robustness of the findings. 
 
Finally, we investigate the question whether communication by the Federal Reserve has the 
potential to influence heterogeneity in forecast performance. The identification of communication 
effects is not without difficulties because traditional measures of central bank communication do 
not entail a geographic component, and the empirical approach has to rely on interaction terms. 
That said, Fed communication in some instances appears successful in reducing information 
asymmetries across market participants. For instance, we find that communication reduces 
disparities in forecast performance across analysts stemming from differences in regional 
economic conditions, whereas we find that the superior forecast accuracy of some analysts is 
related to their ability to extract relatively more or better information from Fed communication. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a brief discussion of related literature, while 
Section 3 discusses in detail the data for the monetary policy forecasts. Section 4 starts by 
outlining the hypotheses related to geography and skills before presenting the empirical results. 
Section 5 analyses the effectiveness of Federal Reserve communication to address the 
heterogeneity in expectations across analysts. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.   Related Literature  
 
To the best of our knowledge, our focus on explaining the cross-section heterogeneity in 
monetary policy expectations for the Fed’s FOMC is new. It is related to two well-established 
strands in the trade and finance literature looking at the role of information and geography, as 
well as to the emerging literature on central bank communication. 
 
Information asymmetries and frictions are important determinants of the direction and intensity of 
trade in goods, trade in financial assets, and financial investment flows—see, among others, Froot 
and Stein (1991), Gordon and Bovenberg (1996), Portes, Rey, and Oh (2001), and Dvorak (2005). 
An interesting result in that line of research is that information asymmetries, in particular 
regarding risks involved with foreign investment, may also be responsible for the home bias in 
cross-country investment and consumption (e.g., Gehrig 1993, Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock 
2004, Portes and Rey 2005).
2  
 
In a related discussion, Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) argue that mutual fund investors are 
more profitable when investing in firms that are located geographically near to the fund’s offices. 
                                                 
1 Another equally likely possibility is that the causality runs in the opposite direction, i.e. that skilled 
analysts move to New York because of the information advantage they obtain from being in a financial 
center. 
2 Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) provide surveys of the home bias literature. 
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proximity to firms hold an advantage in forecasting their performance even when controlling for 
the quality of information provided by firms. Similarly, investors who live near a firm’s 
headquarter have been found to react in a similar manner to releases of public information on this 
firm (Feng and Seasholes 2004). Hau (2001) shows that traders located outside Germany in non-
German speaking cities are less profitable on the German Security Exchange. Although he does 
not find evidence for higher profits by traders in financial centers, there appears to be an 
information advantage in case of proximity to corporate headquarters of a traded firm. 
 
Information also influences location decisions by financial (and other) firms, with information-
based agglomeration effects playing a major role in this case. For instance, Tschoegl (2000), 
Clark (2002), and Cook et al. (2004) show that centripetal forces matter most for financial 
services, even though centrifugal factors in Krugman’s (1998) sense exist. This suggests that the 
need to service locally dispersed customers and advances in communication technology is 
outweighed by the chance to realize information spillovers and economies of scale in information 
processing through agglomeration in financial centers (Thrift 1994, Grote 2004). An additional 
factor seems to be common socio-cultural attitudes, including “face-to-face contact facilitated by 
social proximity” (Faulconbridge 2004, p. 237). The findings on location choice generalize across 
sectors. For instance, Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2005) show that firms generally prefer locating 
close to other headquarters in the same sector. 
 
Finally, our paper touches upon the literature discussing the role of information, transparency, 
and communication for monetary policy. Central banks have a keen interest in guiding 
expectations of economic agents, in particular in financial markets; Blinder (1998) and Bernanke 
(2004), among others, stress the key role of communication in this regard.
3 An emerging 
empirical literature suggests that communication is indeed a powerful tool for this purpose.
4 
Swanson (2006), whose paper is most closely related to our work, looks at the relation between 
Fed transparency and private and financial market interest rate forecasting between 1990 and 
2003. He reports that improvements in transparency (e.g., the start of the regular release of 
meeting minutes or the introduction of statements on the economic outlook) helped making 
private forecasts on average more accurate and decreased their cross-sectional dispersion.
5 
 
The present paper focuses on the cross-sectional dispersion of forecast accuracy of FOMC 
monetary policy decisions. We contribute to the literature by showing that information, 
geography, and personal skills play an important role for the view financial market participants 
take on expected monetary policy action in the US and that markets act on these expectations. 
Moreover, we show that active Fed communication has a significant impact on the formation of 
interest rates forecasts and their cross-sectional dispersion. 
 
 
3.   Data on Monetary Policy Expectations 
 
We start by describing our data for measuring expectations heterogeneity before proceeding to 
discuss the economic relevance of this heterogeneity in the expectations for financial market 
outcomes. 
                                                 
3 The communication channel is a particularly important policy instrument when nominal interest rates are 
close to their zero percent lower bound (see, e.g., Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack 2004, Woodford 2005). 
4 See, for instance, Guthrie and Wright (2000) on the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Kohn and Sack 
(2004) on the Federal Reserve, Reeves and Sawicki (2005) on the Bank of England, and Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2005b) for a comparative study for the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the ECB. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005a), Gürkaynak, and Sack and Swanson (2005) argue that it is in particular 
statements providing indications about the future policy path that move financial markets. 
5 Poole and Rasche (2000), Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002), and Lange, Sack, and Whitesell (2003) 
also discuss interest rate forecasting in the U.S. 
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3.1  Data characteristics 
 
Our database consists of time-series information on monetary policy expectations and other 
variables for 268 professional forecasters – covering many major investment banks, commercial 
banks and forecasting institutions. The data comes from Bloomberg, which chooses which 
institutions and individuals to include in its survey of monetary policy expectations of the Federal 
Reserve. The survey consists of a simple question about what the analysts think will be the most 
likely policy decision of the FOMC in its next meeting. We have available forecasts for all 
FOMC meetings starting in 1999 until September 2005. 
 
How good is the quality of the data on monetary policy decisions? Since the expectations data is 
survey based, one potential concern is about the effort individual analysts put into providing their 
input. However, there are a number of reasons suggesting that this is not a major concern. Most 
importantly, analysts are bound in their survey answers by their recommendations to clients. 
Hence an analyst for an investment bank, for instance, may find it hard to justify why he or she 
gave a recommendation different to the one of the survey. 
 
A series of tests indicates that the forecasts surveyed by Bloomberg are indeed of high quality 
and, as we will show below, significantly linked to financial market behavior. One issue is 
whether there is a problem of self-selection in the surveys. The way the survey works is that 
analysts can provide their forecasts online at any time before the meeting. First, this could imply 
that the lead time, i.e. the number of days an analyst provides his or her forecast before an FOMC 
meeting is related to the degree of uncertainty surrounding the decision. We investigate this 
hypothesis by regressing the absolute forecast error si,t for each analyst on FOMC meetings on the 
lead time, in number of days (Li,t) with which he or she gives the forecasts, and find: 
 
) 0046 . 0 (
, , , 0175 . 0 t i t i t i L s ε + − = , 
 
where the absolute forecast error for each individual si,t is defined as the absolute difference 
between the individual’s forecast r
e
i,t and the actual Fed funds target rate set by the  FOMC rt. The 
number in brackets shows the standard error of the parameter estimate. Given the discrete nature 
of this variable, which changes in steps of 25 b.p., an ordered probit model is used for the above 
regression. The result implies that a longer lead time is associated with a lower forecast error. 
This may suggest that analysts provide their forecasts at an earlier stage when decisions are easier 
to anticipate – and thus predictions turn out to be more accurate – while they enter their forecasts 
later, or revise them at a later stage, when FOMC decisions are harder to foresee. Figure 1 shows 
the evolution of the average absolute forecast errors and the average lead time over the horizon of 
the sample period, further stressing this last point as the lead time goes up in particular during 
periods when FOMC decisions appear to have been relatively easier to anticipate. The empirical 
work in the main body of the paper will control for such common swings in overall forecasting 




Another quality issue could be self-selection, as not all analysts do regularly provide their 
forecasts. It could therefore be that some analysts choose to participate when FOMC decisions are 
generally easier to predict, and abstain when they consider them more uncertain. To investigate 
this possibility, we regress the average absolute forecast error across analysts for each FOMC 
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The OLS results show no significant relationship in the data between participation and the 




The main interest of the paper lies in understanding and explaining the cross-sectional differences 
across analysts’ forecast performance of US monetary policy. How large and variable is this 
heterogeneity over time? Figure 2 shows the standard deviation of forecast errors across analysts 
for each FOMC meeting and the underlying average forecast mistake. While there is some 
variability in this measure over time, there is no clear trend or large outliers that can be identified. 
 
This leads us to an important question for the empirical analysis: How large is the heterogeneity 
in forecast performance across individual analysts? Ranking all forecasters by their average 
absolute forecast errors over the full sample period, we find that the 10% with the best 
performance have on average a forecast error that is about 5 b.p. lower than the worst-performing 
10%. However, as some decisions have been perfectly predicted by all market participants, a 
more informative comparison might look at forecast performance for the more difficult cases. 
Repeating this analysis therefore for all FOMC meetings where forecasters deviated in their 
predictions (and dropping observations for FOMC meetings without dissent), Figure 3 ranks all 
forecasters by their average absolute forecast errors over the full sample period, starting from the 
10% with the lowest average errors in decile 1 to the 10% with the largest mistakes in decile 10. 
The figure shows a remarkable degree of heterogeneity that, in the light of the frequency of 
participation of forecasters, cannot be explained by chance alone: the best forecasters have on 
average a forecast error that is about 10 b.p. lower than the worst-performing analysts.
6 
 
Figures 3 – 4 
 
In order to obtain a measure of cross-sectional heterogeneity robust with regard to self-selection 
(i.e., variations in participation of good or bad forecasters over time), we extract the time fixed 
effects. In other words, the time-corrected forecast errors are obtained as the residuals of 
regressing the absolute forecast error on a comprehensive set of time dummies (i.e., time fixed 
effects), which in essence just subtracts from each individual’s error the average error across all 
individuals for each meeting. Figure 4 shows the distribution of these time-corrected forecast 
errors across analysts. It confirms the large degree of heterogeneity, which remains unchanged at 
roughly 10 b.p. between the best and the worst forecast performers. 
 
3.2  Economic relevance of forecast heterogeneity  
 
Why is the analysis of forecast heterogeneity important? The presence of systematic forecaster 
heterogeneity has potentially important consequences for the real economy. If differing forecast 
accuracy ex ante leads to greater financial market volatility and uncertainty ex post, firms may 
find it more difficult to make investment decisions or to raise funds. As a consequence, the 
allocation of capital to its most efficient uses in investment or production may be distorted.  
 
Thus, before moving to the analysis of the determinants of this heterogeneity, it is worthwhile 
investigating the link between forecast heterogeneity and financial market behavior. The most 
natural way to address is this issue is by testing whether heterogeneity matters for the way 
financial markets respond to the release of the monetary policy decisions by the Federal Reserve. 
                                                 
6 To verify the robustness of these differences, we exclude those forecasters from the sample who have 
participated in less than 25% of the forecasts over the sample period. 
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more volatility in financial markets ex post, as there are more positions that need adjusting.  
 
For that purpose, we test whether market volatility around the release of the FOMC decision, and 
in its aftermath, is related to the heterogeneity of the expectations expressed in the Bloomberg 
survey. We derive a measure for market volatility based on the S&P 500 stock index by 
calculating the standard deviation of 1-minute returns over three separate time windows.
7 The 
first window ranges from 13:45 to 14:45, and thus includes the release of the decision at 14:15. 
The other two windows range from 14:45 to 15:30 and from 15:30 to the close of the market, 
which is usually at 16:00, and thus capture trading in the aftermath of the decision. In this 
fashion, we construct one observation for our dependent variable per time window per FOMC 
meeting.  
 
If t denotes the day of the FOMC meeting, and τ the time window analyzed, we aim to explain 
market volatility ( τ σ , t ) in response to the release of monetary policy decisions. Two determinants 
are of interest in our context: first, the magnitude of the surprise, as measured by the absolute 
mean forecast error reported in Bloomberg (
t s ), and second, the heterogeneity  of market 
expectations, measured as the standard deviation of the surprises calculated across survey 
participant ( t ψ ). In order to control for time variations in market volatility that are unrelated to 
monetary policy, we add another regressor, namely market volatility observed in the same time 
window on the preceding day, ( τ σ , 1 − t ). By using this particular time window, we ensure that our 
benchmark variable is not affected by time-of-the-day patterns in volatility. The model to be 
estimated is therefore as follows: 
 
τ τ τ ε ψ δ γ σ β α σ , , 1 , t t t t t s + + + + = −      (1) 
 
Note that the magnitude of the surprise and its heterogeneity are strongly correlated, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.47. Accordingly, we perform regressions in three steps, by first 
including either one of the two explanatory variables 




Table 1 reports the results of the three different estimated OLS models. It shows that the 
magnitude of the monetary policy surprise affects market volatility in the first and second time 
window under consideration. With larger surprises, market volatility increases. At the same time, 
however, also heterogeneity seems to increase market volatility, in line with our hypothesis. 
Comparing models (1) and (2), the latter explains a somewhat larger share of the variation in the 
data, as indicated by the higher R
2. This is mirrored in model (3), where only the heterogeneity 
variable is estimated significantly.  
 
A second result is that the effect of heterogeneity in expectations on market volatility is estimated 
significantly even for the last time window, whereas the size of the surprise itself is no longer 
relevant. In line with our hypothesis, more heterogeneity in expectations raises market volatility. 
A back of the envelope calculation shows that the increase in volatility is sizeable. For the time 
window ranging from 14:45 to 15:30, market volatility increases relative to the preceding day by 
a factor of around 1.6 in case of zero heterogeneity. For the maximum amount of heterogeneity 
observed in the dataset, market volatility would increase by a factor of 2.2. For the last window, 
the results suggest a factor of 1.15 with no heterogeneity, compared to a factor of around 1.8 with 
maximum heterogeneity.  
 
                                                 
7 Data for the S&P 500 index are taken from TickData Inc.  
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4.   What explains heterogeneity in forecast accuracy? 
 
The present section contains the core analysis of the paper. We start by outlining the empirical 
methodology and continue by discussing our hypotheses related to the role of geography and 
skills in influencing monetary policy forecasts. We then turn to the empirical findings and 
robustness checks. 
 
4.1  Methodology and hypotheses 
 
The main objective of the paper lies in understanding and explaining the cross-sectional 
differences across analysts’ forecast performance of US monetary policy. The key focus is on 
analyzing how much of this heterogeneity in expectations can be attributed to geography and how 
much to the skills of individual analysts. 
 
Our dependent variable is the absolute forecast error for each FOMC meeting by each individual 
analyst who has participated in the survey more than 10 times, si,t. As it turns out, in our sample 
period, si,t is discrete, taking either the value of 0, 25 or 50 b.p. Therefore, we model the effect of 
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where  t i s , ˆ  is an unobserved latent variable that relates to the observable forecast error according 
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The model controls for time fixed effects  by including a full set of time dummies αt. As 
mentioned above, our focus is on the cross-sectional differences across analysts’ forecast 
performance. We therefore want to control for the fact that some FOMC decisions may be more 
difficult to predict than others, and to avoid the resulting potential self-selection bias. Note that 
this also implies that the empirical findings are effectively based only on those FOMC meeting in 
which there was some cross-section heterogeneity. 
 
Turning to the explanatory variables and the underlying hypotheses, geography provides a 
specific economic and informational environment in which individuals operate.
9 We would 
expect that in particular analysts who are located close to the Board of Governors, i.e. in or close 
to Washington DC, or in large financial centers such as New York City have an information 
                                                 
8 Interpreting β can be difficult, especially when using explanatory dummy variables. For instance, 
depending on the cut-off points, a negative dummy coefficient could indicate that a 50 basis-point error is 
less likely but a 25 basis-point error is more likely when the variable takes the value 1. However, this case 
is not relevant in our sample. As a robustness check and to ease interpretation, we will report OLS results in 
addition to ordered probit estimates in what follows. 
9 As is common in the literature on trade in goods and financial assets, we approximate the availability and 
costliness of information through various measures of geographic “proximity”. 
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information advantage could come from more direct contacts or interactions with the Federal 
Reserve, but it could also come from the fact that Washington DC and financial centers have a 
high concentration of institutions focused on issues related to monetary policy. Thus information 
sharing may be more efficient in such hubs, improving the forecast performance of analysts. 
More generally, it is possible that analysts located in the United States have better information 
about US monetary policy, e.g. through the easier and more diverse availability of various media, 
than analysts located abroad. Similarly, language may matter as one would expect that analysts 
working in an English-language environment have an information advantage over those working 
primarily in a foreign-language environment. As English is, however, widespread as a working 
language in particular among financial institutions also in non-English speaking countries, an 
English-language environment may in practice not provide much of a gain.   
 
We use various locational variables for geographic proximity. First, the geographic coverage of 
the data is large, as our dataset includes 268 forecasters located across 98 cities in 15 countries. 
Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of the geographic coverage. 
 




A second type of geographic proximity that may play an important role is the specific local or 
regional economic environment analysts are operating in. Location choices of institutions often 
imply that their businesses are more strongly connected to regional clients or partners. Thus 
information about the immediate geographic surroundings may be better and more ample. 
Institutions may therefore (consciously or unconsciously) use this regional or local knowledge to 
help make inferences about economic developments elsewhere. For the anticipation of monetary 
policy, this means that analysts may be significantly influenced by their regional economic 
conditions when making predictions about US monetary policy. We have three such regional 
economic indicators – CPI inflation for the four US census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South 
and West), as well as personal income growth and employment growth for all US states – and can 
match these to the location of the analysts in our sample.
10 If analysts indeed incorporate a 
regional perspective, they may (mis-)interpret strong deviations of regional developments from 
their long-term average as indicative of US-wide changes. As a consequence, larger absolute 
deviations of current conditions from the regional “norm” might lead an analyst to make larger 
forecast errors.
11 A significant effect of this variable for analysts’ forecast accuracy signals that 
analysts base their forecasts at least partially on local information. 
 
Tables 4 – 5 
 
Tables 4 and 5 give summary statistics for all of these variables, as well as a breakdown of the 
information between the USA and abroad (Table 4), and across the individual regions of the 
United States (Table 5). Out of the 268 analysts, 194 are located in the United States and 74 
abroad. There are a number of interesting and noteworthy characteristics in the data. For instance, 
about one third of all forecasters are based in financial centers, in particular New York City, but 
also major financial hubs such as Chicago, London, Hong Kong, Frankfurt or Boston.  
                                                 
10 Regional CPI data, while providing less cross-sectional variance than metropolitan area CPI data, poses 
fewer matching problems with forecaster locations across the US. CPI inflation and nonfarm payroll data 
(Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics) are available real time, on a monthly frequency. Personal income 
growth data are quarterly (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis). 
11 Ideally, we would like to test the same hypothesis for US national aggregate data. Unfortunately, this is 
not possible in the framework of model (1), as any variable which varies only across time, and not across 
analysts is wiped out by the set of time dummies. We however include below the absolute deviation of 
current US economic developments from their long-term average for non-US residents in the sample. 
14
ECB
Working Paper Series No 695
November 2006 
Geography Skills 
Regional economic conditions:  Macro forecast performance: 
CPI inflation 
difference 
Absolute difference between 
current regional inflation and its 
sample average  
CPI inflation 
forecast 
D=1 if the individual’s average 
inflation forecast error is below 
sample median; D=0 otherwise 
or if no forecast is available  
Income growth 
difference 
Absolute difference between 
current regional income growth 




D=1 if the individual’s average 
industrial production forecast 
error is below sample median; 
D=0 otherwise or if no forecast 




Absolute difference between 
current regional growth in non-
farm payrolls and its sample 
average  Individual background: 
   Institution:   
Location:  Investment bank  D=1 if analyst works for such 
institution; D=0 otherwise 
Distance to 
Federal Reserve 
Distance from Washington DC 
(in 1000 km) 
Commercial 
bank 
D=1 if analyst works for such 
institution; D=0 otherwise 
Washington DC  D=1 if analyst is located in 
Washington DC; D=0 otherwise 
Forecast 
institution 
D=1 if analyst works for such 
institution; D=0 otherwise 
New York City  D=1 if analyst is located in New 





D=1 if analyst is located in Chic-
ago, Boston, London, HK, Paris, 
Frankfurt, Madrid or S.Francisco 
Economist  D=1 if analyst holds this job 
title; D=0 otherwise 
USA  D=1 if analyst is located in 
neither DC, NYC or a US 
financial center, but resides in 
the US; D=0 otherwise 
Senior 
Economist 
D=1 if analyst holds this job 
title; D=0 otherwise 
English 
language 
D=1 if foreign analyst is located 
in Canada, UK, Ireland or 
Australia; D=0 otherwise 
Chief Economist  D=1 if analyst holds this job 




Regional dummies each for the 
four US census regions 
Executive  D=1 if analyst holds this job 
title; D=0 otherwise 
   Education:   
   Bachelor's 
degree 
D=1 if analyst has this as 
highest degree; D=0 otherwise 
    Master's degree  D=1 if analyst has this as 
highest degree; D=0 otherwise 
    PhD degree  D=1 if analyst has this as 
highest degree; D=0 otherwise 
   Employment history: 
   Fed  Board  of 
Governors 
D=1 if analyst worked for this 
institution before; D=0 else  
    Fed New York  D=1 if analyst worked for this 
institution before; D=0 else 
      
 
 
                                                 
12 Note that the definition of financial centers here is clearly not all encompassing, and one could also argue 
for alternative definitions. However, the empirical findings presented below are robust to changing the set 
of cities defined as financial centers, i.e. when extending the set of cities or when reducing it – for instance, 
when including Philadelphia or excluding San Francisco etc. 
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linked to their personal skills and also the resources their institutions provide them with. First, the 
type of institution an analyst works for may matter. For instance, anticipating monetary policy 
decisions may be even more important for investment banks or specialized forecast institutions 
than for other financial or non-financial institutions. Second, we expect that the professional 
experience and employment record are also likely to have a significant effect on the performance 
of analysts in predicting Fed policy. In particular, someone who has previously worked for the 
Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors may have a superior understanding of the functioning of 
the FOMC and its communication. Third, technical expertise may give analysts with a Master’s 
or Ph.D. degree as an educational background an edge in the forecasts. 
 
These personal characteristics are obviously rather indirect ways of approximating the skills and 
ability of analysts. But we also have a more direct measure of skills, namely the forecasts of other 
economic variables – CPI inflation and industrial production – for many of the analysts in our 
sample. As both variables are also highly relevant for monetary policy decisions, we would 
expect that analysts who perform well in predicting US inflation and industrial production are 
also better in anticipating US monetary policy decisions at that particular point in time. To 
capture the overall quality or skill level in the empirical implementation we focus on the relative 
quality of forecasters compared to the sample median across time and individuals. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 offer some summary statistics for these skills-related variables. Some interesting 
features of the data emerge. For instance, there is some concentration of analysts across 
institutions as almost half of them work for investment banks. In comparison, the distribution 
across job positions is rather even, while a relatively large share of analysts who provide 
information have a Ph.D. or Master’s degree. It should be noted that employment and education 
backgrounds are not available for several analysts. We therefore created a separate variable for 
these, included under “no information”. 
 
 
4.2  Empirical results 
 
Our modeling strategy is to start by analyzing the role of geography in explaining forecast errors 
of US monetary policy, then to move to skills and finally to combine both sets of variables in a 
single model. 
 
4.2.1  Geography 
 
Table 6 presents the results for the geography variables in the ordered probit model, using 
different specifications. Model (1) shows the influence of distance, an often used proxy for 
information costs in the literature on trade in goods and financial assets. However, we find that 
greater distance from Washington DC, the seat of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors, is 
not associated with a statistically significantly higher forecast error. In model (2), we ask whether 
there are differences across the four US regions and indeed find that analysts located in the 
Northeast and the Midwest perform significantly better than those of the excluded group from the 
model, in this case all non-US analysts. Part of the reason for this better performance may be that 
the Northeastern and Midwestern regions include most of the major financial centers of the 




In model (3), we therefore test the role of specific locations. We find that analysts based in 
Washington DC, in New York City, and in other financial centers do better than analysts located 
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13 By contrast, forecasters in other US locations, or those based in countries with 
English as the main language do not appear to make smaller forecast errors than other foreign 
analysts (model (4)). What this suggests is that there are indeed strong information advantages in 
financial hubs, pointing to an important role of geographic “proximity”. 
 
The second proxy for the role of geography is the regional economic environment analysts 
operate in. Model (5) shows the point estimates for the absolute difference of CPI inflation, 
income growth and employment growth from their averages over the whole sample period. The 
results indicate that regional conditions indeed play a role, with larger deviations in inflation and 
employment growth leading to significantly higher forecast errors about US monetary policy. 
 
Finally, model (6) combines the various location and regional conditions variables in a single 
estimation. The results are generally robust to this extension, though the effect of financial centers 
other than New York City does not remain statistically significant. On the other hand, the 
combined model identifies an additional, albeit only marginally significant, effect of deviations in 
regional income growth, with larger absolute deviations pointing to larger forecast errors. 
Estimates of the same model by OLS (i.e., ignoring the discrete nature of the forecast error) 
confirm the findings of the ordered probit models, with slight changes in the significance level of 
regional macroeconomic differences. 
 
 
4.2.2  Skills 
 
Table 7 gives the empirical results for the effects of various measures of analysts’ skills and 
ability on forecast performance; first only for each category, then by combining the different skill 




Regarding institutional affiliations, in model (1) we find that analysts who work for investment 
banks have significantly lower forecast errors of FOMC decisions compared to the excluded 
benchmark group, namely analysts working for other financial or non-financial institutions and 
academics. The coefficient for individuals working for forecast institutions is slightly 
insignificant in this specification, although such analysts are found to perform marginally better 
in the more complete specification of model (6). 
 
As to job classifications, forecasters with the job title of Economist, Senior Economist or Chief 
Economist appear to perform significantly better than analysts who are executives in their 
institutions and form the excluded category in the regression. This may seem somewhat 
surprising as one may expect that executives have more experience and thus should be able to 
predict US monetary policy decisions at least equally well. One interpretation is that executives 
have a multitude of tasks and therefore have less time to acquire or maintain the specific expertise 
to do well in anticipating FOMC decisions. The results may also be influenced by an omitted 
variable bias as, for instance, forecasters who have the title of an executive may disproportionally 
work for specific institution types, such as small think tanks or non-financial institutions, and thus 
do worse merely because of their affiliation. However, model (6) shows that the findings with 
regard to the superior performance of economists and chief economists are robust when 
controlling for the full set of institutional and other analyst characteristics. 
 
In addition, the employment history matters for forecast performance. Model (3) shows that 
individuals who have worked for the Board of Governors in the past do a significantly better job 
                                                 
13 Note that it is not straightforward to interpret the coefficients, due to the non-linear nature of the ordered 
probit model, as the coefficients give only the marginal effects at each variable’s mean. We will return to a 
more detailed discussion of the marginal effects and their interpretation further below. 
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determinants, as shown in model (6). This result suggests that having first-hand knowledge in the 
functioning and thinking of the Federal Reserve should provide an analyst with a valuable 
advantage compared to other analysts in predicting FOMC decisions. 
 
Fourth, the educational background appears to also play a significant role. Interestingly, analysts 
with a Ph.D. – the excluded category in model (4) – do significantly worse than those with a 
Master’s degree. Two possible explanations come to mind for this result. On the one hand, it may 
imply that specific technical expertise may not be crucial for being a good forecaster of US 
monetary policy. On the other hand, it may indicate that it is not the level of the degree, but the 
quality or type of degree – for which we do not have information – that explains this effect. For 
instance, those who have a Master’s degree as their last degree may have an MBA, which in turn 
may signal something specific about the effort and qualifications of these analysts. 
 
Finally, a much more direct proxy for the skills of analysts is their ability to forecast other 
economic variables, such as US inflation and industrial production developments. While there is 
no effect of the quality of industrial production forecasts on the accuracy of forecasts of monetary 
policy decisions, model (5) indicates that indeed analysts who are, on average, better in predicting 
the next inflation figure after an FOMC meeting than the sample median are also better in 
correctly anticipating the FOMC decision. Overall, this finding is probably the strongest direct 
evidence that skills matter for the forecast accuracy of US monetary policy. 
 
Controlling for the robustness of results by re-estimating the combined model (6) using OLS 
corroborates the findings in general, as shown in column (7), with only one change: the superior 
performance of chief economists turns insignificant.  
 
4.2.3  Geography versus skills 
 
As the final part of the analysis, we include the various proxies for geography and for individual 
skills in the same model specification. It is important to combine the different categories in order 
to counter the possibility that geography and skills of analysts are not independent from one 
another. This may imply that what we measure as the effect of geography could at least in part 
reflect differences in the skill set of analysts, or vice versa effects of skills may represent the 
impact of geography. If, for instance, skilled analysts tended to move to New York City 
disproportionally, then the geography variable for New York City may pick up this concentration 
of skills, rather than information alone. However, the causality of this relationship could also be 
the reverse in that institutions move their analysts to New York or another major financial center 




Table 8 provides the empirical findings for this combined model. Overall, the results are mostly 
robust as most of the variables retain their statistical significance. In only a few cases do variables 
lose their statistical significance. For instance, the professional experience of having worked for 
the Federal Reserve before does enter the expanded ordered probit model only marginally 
significant. Only minor changes are apparent when non-US residents are dropped from the 
sample, as shown in the second set of results in Table 8. In this case, professional Fed experience 
regains its significance, whereas regional inflation differences become statistically insignificant.  
 
In order to obtain a more direct proxy for the quantitative effect of each of the variables on the 
monetary policy forecast error, we estimate the same model using OLS. The results shown in the 
right-hand side columns of Table 8 support the previous qualitative and statistical findings for the 
geography variables. Quantitatively, according to the linear model, analysts based in New York 
or in another financial center perform on average about 2 b.p. better than others. This gain is even 
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is 4 b.p. lower. 
 
The significance of most of the skill variables is also confirmed in the combined model. 
Institutions, job position and educational background all continue to exert a substantial impact on 
forecast accuracy. Equally importantly, analysts who do well in predicting the next inflation 
figure are also more accurate in predicting the next FOMC meeting. In fact, analysts who are 
better than the mean in forecasting inflation have a roughly 1.7 b.p. lower forecast error. 
 
In summary, both geography and individual skills play a substantial role for the forecast accuracy 
of US monetary policy decisions. In particular the magnitude of the effects of several of the 
geography and skill proxies underline the overall large importance they have in explaining the 
heterogeneity in the ability of agents to anticipate policy decisions by the Federal Reserve. 
 
 
5.   The Role of Fed Communication 
 
There is a rapidly growing literature on the importance of communication for the predictability of 
the Federal Reserve and other central banks (see Section 2). However, almost all of the studies in 
this literature concentrate on the mean or consensus expectations of financial markets. By 
contrast, our objective in this section is to analyze the effect of communication on the 
heterogeneity of expectations across individual market participants. 
 
Heterogeneity of expectations is at least in part undesirable from a monetary policy perspective as 
it may create significant differences in the understanding of FOMC policy decisions and thus the 
transmission process of policy. A key question therefore is: what can a central bank do to affect 
this heterogeneity in expectations? In particular, what role does communication play in this 
regard? Communication is potentially a powerful tool not only to convey a particular policy 
message and alter the consensus or mean of expectations, but may also be used to influence the 
degree of heterogeneity among market participants. This section analyses to what extent Fed 
communication has exerted such an influence on the heterogeneity of expectations in the past, 
and through what channels this effect has functioned. More precisely, we ask whether 
communication policy can be used in a systematic manner so as to reduce this heterogeneity 
stemming from differences in geography and skills, and thus promote a more homogenous 
understanding of monetary policy. 
 
We stress that the identification of effects of Fed communication on heterogeneity in forecast 
accuracy is not without difficulties. Traditional measures of Fed communication do not entail a 
geographic component (see below). As a result, the empirical approach has to rely on interaction 
terms – that is, we ask whether the effect of the variables explaining the heterogeneity of forecast 
accuracy varies as the Fed communicates. However, identification through interaction terms is an 
indirect approach that may or may not be sufficient to capture all effects of Fed communication. 
Ultimately, of course, this is an empirical question. 
 
For this purpose, we take the data on communication by FOMC members developed in Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2006), and investigate the effect on the heterogeneity of expectations and its 
channels. Based on newswire service reports of statements about the monetary policy inclination 




First, we employ the frequency of Fed communication (measured as the number of statements 
recorded in the dataset during an inter-meeting period) as a proxy for the information content of 
                                                 
14 A detailed outline and explanation of the data and its underlying methodology is provided in Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2006). 
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information provided by the Federal Reserve should not only enhance the ability of market 
participants to anticipate the subsequent FOMC decision, but also reduce the heterogeneity in 
expectations across agents if this information is understood and processed by all agents in a 
similar way. 
 
Second, we analyze the effect of communication dispersion, i.e. the extent of disagreement across 


















, with N the number of statements in the inter-meeting period that 
ends on meeting day t, C the statements classified as dovish, neutral or hawkish as {-1,0,+1}, and 
a dummy D with D=0 if N is an even number and D=1 if it is odd. This normalization allows us 
to obtain a dispersion measure that lies strictly between zero (no dispersion) and one. Our prior is 
that if there is a high degree of disagreement, then it should raise uncertainty about the upcoming 
FOMC policy decision and thus also increase the heterogeneity in expectations. 
 
To test whether communication policy helps reduce the effects that differences in geography and 
skills have on the heterogeneity of expectations, we estimate an extension of model (2) which 
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Note that the communication variable ct  alone cannot be included in model (3) due to the 
inclusion of the time fixed effects αt. Our key hypothesis of interest is H0: γk =0. Whenever γk is 
different from zero, the model identifies that Fed communication affects forecast heterogeneity; if 
the sign of a γk is opposite of the sign of the corresponding βk (where k refers to the kth 
explanatory variable included in Xi,t), communication reduces heterogeneity; in the case of 
equally signed coefficients, it tends to enhance it instead. Recall from Tables 6-8 that most of the 
coefficients βk of the benchmark models are negative – for instance, being located in a financial 
center reduces the forecast error si,t of an analyst. This means that γk  >0 implies that a particular 
communication policy reduces or even eliminates the impact of a particular geographic or skill-
related characteristic on the absolute forecast error. By contrast, γk  <0 entails that communication 
has the opposite effect of widening the information asymmetries and thus the dispersion in 
forecast accuracy. For the variables measuring regional macroeconomic disparities, the 




Table 9 shows the results for the interaction coefficients γk. A first central finding is that Fed 
communication appears to be successful in reducing the heterogeneity in forecast accuracy 
stemming from disparities in regional economic conditions. For instance, a higher frequency of 
communication reduces the effect of regional income growth differentials on the heterogeneity of 
forecast errors. Somewhat surprisingly, also a more dispersed communication flow from the Fed 
to the public helps analysts overcome some of the confusion stemming from diverging regional 
economic conditions. We interpret this result as being indicative that Fed communication indeed 
succeeds in reducing information asymmetries that come from the differences in regional 
economic conditions which influence agents’ expectations about FOMC policy decisions. 
 
A second finding is that Fed communication mostly raises the heterogeneity in forecast 
performance that stems from differences in the skills and abilities of individual analysts, as 
suggested by the mostly negative coefficients. For instance, communication reduces the forecast 
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those analysts who on average show lower forecast errors of US monetary policy decisions. 
Similar evidence is found for differences in education: analysts with Master’s degrees benefit 
relatively more from Fed communication in terms of improved forecast performance. An 
interpretation of this result is that those analysts who are relatively good in anticipating FOMC 
policy decisions obtain these superior forecast skills at least partly from their ability to better 
extract information from Fed communication. 
 
Finally, there is also some limited evidence that communication plays a role for geographic 
characteristics of analysts. In fact, Fed communication improves the forecast performance of 
analysts based in New York City or the United States; though in other cases the point estimates 
are not statistically significant. 
 
In summary, Fed communication appears to reduce information asymmetries along some 
dimensions, but may increase it along others. On the one hand, the results suggest that 
communication can indeed be effective in reducing disparities in forecast performance across 
analysts stemming from differences in regional economic conditions. Thus communication in 
some instances appears successful in reducing information asymmetries across market 
participants. On the other hand, at least part of the superior forecast accuracy stemming from 
analysts’ individual background appears to be related to their ability to extract more or better 
information from Fed communication. 
 
 
6.   Conclusions 
 
Information and geography play an important role in financial markets by affecting asset prices, 
trading behavior, and the location choice of financial firms. This paper has asked whether this 
pattern extends to the expectation formation process regarding monetary policy decisions, by 
analyzing whether geography and to what degree personal skills determine the ability of 
professional forecasters to predict monetary policy decisions by the US Federal Reserve. Based 
on a novel dataset of 268 professional forecasters located across 98 cities in 15 countries, we 
found that the degree of heterogeneity in the forecast performance across individuals is large: the 
average absolute forecasts error by the group of the 10% of the worst forecasters is 5 b.p. higher 
than that of the best decile of analysts (10 b.p. if we focus on FOMC meetings where not all 
forecasters agreed). In fact, this is similar to the order of magnitude we have found in a related 
analysis for the heterogeneity of forecasts of ECB monetary policy decisions (Berger, Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher 2006). 
 
The paper has demonstrated that this heterogeneity has important repercussions on trading 
behavior, with significant effects on market volatility. This could distort investment decisions of 
firms, make it more difficult for firms to raise funds for investment or production, and could 
decrease the efficient allocation of capital. But what explains the heterogeneity in forecasting 
accuracy? The paper has focused on the role of geography and skills of analysts in forecasting US 
monetary policy.  
 
We show that a number of locational factors systematically influence the ability of forecasters to 
anticipate US monetary policy. In particular, the prediction error of those in Washington DC, 
New York City or in another financial center, either in the USA or abroad, is about 2 to 4 b.p. 
lower. Importantly, the paper has found that forecasters take a regional perspective in that 
regional economic developments shape their forecasting ability for US monetary policy. In 
particular, forecasters make larger errors the more economic developments in their home region 
differ from their average. This finding applies to regional developments in inflation as well as 
income and employment growth. The result is important as it underlines that monetary policy 
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in forecasting inflation also perform well in predicting monetary policy decisions. This provides a 
strong, and the most direct piece of evidence that skills and individual background are 
significantly linked to the forecast accuracy of monetary policy decisions. Moreover, analysts 
who work for investment banks or specialized forecast institutions or think tanks do better than 
those in other financial and non-financial companies. But also professional experience and 
education influence forecast accuracy, as does (albeit to a smaller degree) an employment history 
with the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors. 
 
What do these findings imply for policy? First of all, it should be stressed that not all 
heterogeneity in expectations is necessarily undesirable from a policy perspective, in particular if 
such differences are the result of different degrees of investment in information gathering by 
analysts’ institutions. Moreover, differential expectations about policy decisions may at times 
also provide useful information to policy-makers. Therefore, the primary nature of the analysis of 
the paper is a positive one, i.e. to document the magnitude and understand the determinants of the 
heterogeneity in monetary policy expectations.  
 
At the same time, some of the analysis has some normative implications, though these can be no 
more than tentative and suggestive. Clearly, it is desirable for central banks to disseminate 
information and knowledge as equally as possible across agents not least because a high degree of 
heterogeneity is likely to result in financial market uncertainty and volatility. The identification of 
communication effects in our framework is not without difficulties because traditional measures 
of central bank communication do not entail a geographic component and the empirical approach 
has to rely on indirect means. Nevertheless, our empirical findings indicate that Fed 
communication policies have indeed been successful in reducing disparities in forecast 
performance stemming from differences in regional economic conditions. However, 
communication appears to have been less successful in addressing those disparities that stem 
from differences in skills of analysts. In particular the fact that such heterogeneity is linked to 
regional factors, which significantly influence forecasters’ expectations, raises many issues for 
policy-makers, such as the choice of communication tools and strategies to enhance a more 
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Note: The solid line (left y-axis) shows the average number of days before an FOMC meeting that the 
forecasters have provided their monetary policy forecasts. The bars (right y-axis) show the average absolute 
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Note: The solid line (left y-axis) shows the standard deviation of the absolute forecast errors across 
individual forecasters by FOMC meeting. The bars (right y-axis) show the average absolute forecast error 
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Note: The figure shows the average absolute forecast error in b.p. by individual forecaster, ranging from the 
decile with the lowest forecast errors in decile 1 to those 10% with the highest prediction error in decile 10, 
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Note: The figure shows the average absolute time-corrected forecast error in b.p. by individual forecaster, 
ranging from the decile with the lowest forecast errors in decile 1 to those 10% with the highest prediction 
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November 2006Table 1:  The effect of monetary policy surprises and heterogeneity in expectations 
on the S&P 500 
 
coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
Absolute surprise 0.135 ** 0.055 -- -- 0.074 0.054
Heterogeneity -- -- 0.238 *** 0.062 0.187 *** 0.070




Absolute surprise 0.079 ** 0.037 -- -- 0.042 0.031
Heterogeneity -- -- 0.141 *** 0.045 0.113 ** 0.045




Absolute surprise 0.018 0.024 -- -- -0.009 0.020
Heterogeneity -- -- 0.076 *** 0.023 0.082 *** 0.027
Volatility, preceding day 0.579 *** 0.145 0.588 *** 0.126 0.600 *** 0.135
# observations
R











Note: The table explains volatility of the S&P 500 returns on FOMC announcement days through the 
magnitude of the monetary policy surprise (measured by the absolute mean forecast error in the Bloomberg 
survey), the heterogeneity in market expectations (measured by the standard deviation of the individual 
forecast errors) and volatility during the identical time window on the preceding trading day. FOMC 
releases are made at 14:15. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate 
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China Italy The Netherlands
Denmark Portugal United Kingdom






Table 3:  City coverage 
 
Albany   Copenhagen   Jupiter   New Canaan   Saint Louis  
Amsterdam   Danville   Kennesaw   New Haven Saint Petersburg  
Ann Arbor   Detroit   King of Prussia New York City Salt Lake City  
Arlington Dublin   Leeds Newport Beach   San Francisco  
Atlanta   East Lansing   Lexington Northville   Silicon Valley
Baltimore   El Paso   Lisbon Oakland   Stamford  
Berlin   Essen   Lisle Omaha   Stockholm  
Birmingham   Fairfield   Little Rock Ottawa   Stuttgart  
Bonn   Frankfurt am Main   London Paris   Sydney  
Boston Greenwich   Los Angeles   Pasadena   Tempe  
Boulder Hamburg   Lugano   Pepper Pike   Toronto  
Bridgeport   Hannover   Madrid   Philadelphia   Utrecht  
Burlington   Hoboken   McLean   Phoenixville Valhalla  
Calabasas   Holland Menomonee Falls   Pittsburgh   Vineland  
Chapel Hill Hong Kong Milan   Potomac   Washington DC
Charlotte   Honolulu   Milwaukee   Princeton   West Chester  
Chicago   Houston   Minneapolis   Raleigh   Wilmington
Cleveland   Islandia Montreal   Richmond   Zug  
College Park Jacksonville Muenchen   Rome  
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November 2006Table 4:  Summary statistics, US and foreign forecasters 
 
# obs mean std. dev. min. max. # obs mean # obs mean
Dependent variable:
Monetary policy forecast error 268 3.17 4.49 0 25 194 3.40 74 2.56
Location:
Distance to Federal Reserve 268 2.06 2.70 0 13.11 194 0.75 74 5.71
Washington DC 268 0.05 0.22 0 1 194 0.07 74 0.00
New York City 268 0.26 0.44 0 1 194 0.35 74 0.00
Financial center 268 0.17 0.37 0 1 194 0.13 74 0.27
USA 268 0.72 0.45 0 1 194 1.00 74 0.00
English language 268 0.81 0.40 0 1 194 1.00 74 0.30
Foreign 268 0.28 0.45 0 1 194 0.00 74 1.00
Regional economic conditions:
CPI inflation difference 268 0.571 0.211 0.030 1.496 194 0.580 74 0.547
Income growth difference 268 0.021 0.010 0.001 0.063 194 0.023 74 0.017
Employment growth difference 268 0.014 0.007 0.000 0.040 194 0.015 74 0.011
Individual background
Institution:
     Investment bank 268 0.47 0.50 0 1 194 0.51 74 0.35
     Commercial bank 268 0.23 0.42 0 1 194 0.12 74 0.51
     Forecast institution 268 0.15 0.36 0 1 194 0.19 74 0.04
     Other institution 268 0.16 0.36 0 1 194 0.18 74 0.09
Job position:
     Economist 268 0.12 0.33 0 1 194 0.08 74 0.24
     Senior Economist 268 0.07 0.26 0 1 194 0.08 74 0.05
     Chief Economist 268 0.26 0.44 0 1 194 0.30 74 0.15
     Executive 268 0.18 0.38 0 1 194 0.20 74 0.14
     No information 268 0.36 0.48 0 1 194 0.34 74 0.42
Education:
     Bachelor's degree 268 0.04 0.20 0 1 194 0.04 74 0.04
     Master's degree 268 0.19 0.39 0 1 194 0.22 74 0.09
     PhD degree 268 0.21 0.41 0 1 194 0.27 74 0.04
     No information 268 0.56 0.50 0 1 194 0.46 74 0.82
Employment history:
     Fed Board of Governors 268 0.04 0.20 0 1 194 0.06 74 0.00
     Fed New York 268 0.02 0.15 0 1 194 0.03 74 0.00
     No Fed experience 268 0.59 0.49 0 1 194 0.60 74 0.57
     No information 268 0.35 0.48 0 1 194 0.31 74 0.43
Macro forecast performance
CPI inflation forecast 121 0.001 0.007 -0.002 0.069 76 0.000 45 0.003
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November 2006Table 5:  Summary statistics, by US region 
 
# obs mean # obs mean # obs mean # obs mean
Dependent variable:
Monetary policy forecast error 100 3.05 32 3.13 45 3.55 17 6.13
Location:
Distance to Federal Reserve 100 0.36 32 0.97 45 0.48 17 3.70
Washington DC 100 0.00 32 0.00 45 0.29 17 0.00
New York City 100 0.68 32 0.00 45 0.00 17 0.00
Financial center 100 0.10 32 0.34 45 0.00 17 0.27
USA 100 1.00 32 1.00 45 1.00 17 1.00
English language 100 1.00 32 1.00 45 1.00 17 1.00
Foreign 100 0.00 32 0.00 45 0.00 17 0.00
Regional economic conditions:
CPI inflation difference 100 0.541 32 0.680 45 0.597 17 0.571
Income growth difference 100 0.027 32 0.014 45 0.022 17 0.019
Employment growth difference 100 0.016 32 0.012 45 0.014 17 0.014
Individual background
Institution:
     Investment bank 100 0.65 32 0.34 45 0.27 17 0.67
     Commercial bank 100 0.11 32 0.22 45 0.07 17 0.07
     Forecast institution 100 0.15 32 0.22 45 0.29 17 0.13
     Other institution 100 0.09 32 0.22 45 0.38 17 0.13
Job position:
     Economist 100 0.10 32 0.03 45 0.07 17 0.07
     Senior Economist 100 0.11 32 0.09 45 0.02 17 0.07
     Chief Economist 100 0.32 32 0.31 45 0.27 17 0.27
     Executive 100 0.16 32 0.31 45 0.20 17 0.20
     No information 100 0.31 32 0.25 45 0.42 17 0.40
Education:
     Bachelor's degree 100 0.04 32 0.06 45 0.04 17 0.00
     Master's degree 100 0.24 32 0.28 45 0.13 17 0.20
     PhD degree 100 0.30 32 0.16 45 0.36 17 0.07
     No information 100 0.42 32 0.50 45 0.47 17 0.73
Employment history:
     Fed Board of Governors 100 0.08 32 0.03 45 0.04 17 0.00
     Fed New York 100 0.06 32 0.00 45 0.00 17 0.00
     No Fed experience 100 0.61 32 0.63 45 0.58 17 0.53
     No information 100 0.25 32 0.34 45 0.38 17 0.47
Macro forecast performance
CPI inflation forecast 56 0.000 8 0.000 7 0.000 5 0.000
Industrial production forecast 56 0.000 8 -0.001 8 0.000 5 -0.002
Midwest South West Northeast
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November 2006Table 8:  Geography versus individual skills: explaining the accuracy of forecasts of 
FOMC monetary policy decisions 
 
 
coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
Location:
Washington DC -1.148 ** 0.452 -0.961 ** 0.411 -4.023 *** 1.447
New York City -0.380 ** 0.192 -0.288 ** 0.146 -2.090 ** 0.976
Financial center -0.459 *** 0.173 -0.398 ** 0.185 -2.196 *** 0.853
USA -0.089 0.190 -0.752 0.963
English language 0.101 0.236 0.421 1.089
Regional economic conditions:
CPI inflation difference 0.379 ** 0.181 0.207 0.190 2.806 ** 1.161
Income growth difference 10.596 * 6.026 11.182 * 5.930 32.597 32.043
Employment growth difference 13.482 ** 5.691 13.151 ** 5.756 62.426 ** 27.536
Individual background
Institution:
     Investment bank -0.429 ** 0.178 -0.378 ** 0.189 -1.916 ** 0.896
     Commercial bank -0.181 0.195 -0.097 0.223 -0.859 0.992
     Forecast institution -0.355 * 0.193 -0.311 0.202 -1.541 0.966
Job position:
     Economist -0.480 * 0.270 -1.132 ** 0.504 -2.047 * 1.194
     Senior Economist -0.137 0.233 -0.241 0.268 -0.673 1.089
     Chief Economist -0.165 0.184 -0.413 ** 0.203 -0.765 0.943
     No information 0.014 0.201 -0.257 0.216 0.127 1.027
Employment history:
     Fed Board of Governors -0.409 0.258 -0.496 ** 0.252 -1.820 * 0.969
     Fed New York -0.087 0.210 -0.091 0.213 -0.402 1.036
     No information -0.086 0.142 0.020 0.185 -0.810 0.704
Education:
     Bachelor's degree -0.140 0.291 0.225 0.341 -0.760 1.317
     Master's degree -0.398 *** 0.147 -0.359 ** 0.148 -1.744 ** 0.684
     No information -0.030 0.145 -0.102 0.157 0.041 0.708
Macro forecast performance
CPI inflation forecast -0.459 *** 0.166 -0.525 *** 0.190 -1.733 *** 0.641
Industrial production forecast 0.157 0.160 0.121 0.178 0.647 0.708
# of observations
McFadden's adj. R
2 (OLS: adj. R
2)
Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) adj. R
2
McKelvey & Zavoina's R









Notes: See tables 7 and 8 for the definition of the variables. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 
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November 2006Table 9: The role of Federal Reserve communication policy for geography and skills 
 
 
coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
Location:
Washington DC -0.345 0.400 -1.199 1.462
New York City -0.363 ** 0.168 -0.570 0.703
Financial center -0.099 0.171 -0.532 0.749
USA -0.410 ** 0.198 -1.434 0.892
English language 0.149 0.272 1.221 1.333
Regional economic conditions:
CPI inflation difference -0.025 0.166 -0.336 0.981
Income growth difference -0.897 ** 0.422 -2.782 ** 1.198
Employment growth difference -0.029 0.169 0.318 0.730
Individual background
Institution:
     Investment bank -0.538 *** 0.210 -2.961 *** 0.799
     Commercial bank -0.848 *** 0.229 -3.757 *** 0.934
     Forecast institution -0.596 *** 0.232 -2.751 *** 0.933
Job position:
     Economist 0.684 ** 0.271 2.265 * 1.166
     Senior Economist 0.296 0.237 1.195 0.914
     Chief Economist 0.356 * 0.198 1.142 0.802
     No information 0.309 0.217 0.410 0.866
Employment history:
     Fed Board of Governors -0.186 0.239 -1.078 0.880
     Fed New York -0.152 0.168 -0.179 0.726
     No information -0.178 0.148 -0.043 0.610
Education:
     Bachelor's degree 0.021 0.291 -1.240 1.098
     Master's degree -0.378 *** 0.145 -1.751 *** 0.594
     No information -0.167 0.154 -0.730 0.602
Macro forecast performance
CPI inflation forecast -0.106 0.138 -0.953 0.602




Cragg-Uhler (Nagelkerke) adj. R
2












Notes:  The table shows the coefficients for the listed variables, interacted with the corresponding 
communication variable in each column from model (3), obtained from ordered probit estimates. See tables 
7 and 8 for the definition of the non-interacted variables. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99%, 
95%, and 90% levels, respectively. 
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